Avant-propos: Les corrections nécessaires au mysticisme romantique.--Le mysticisme de la race. Les plus récents théoriciens du pangermanisme.--Un débat sur le mysticisme éstht́ique: Erwin Rohde et Fréderic Nietzsche.--Une doctrine du mysticisme social. Les étapes du Marxisme.--La doctrine morale de Tolstoï.--Appendice: I. Le mysticisme passionel. II. Un nouveau mysticisme social.--Table des matières.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Mind of Charles Hartshorne: A Critical Examination by Donald Wayne Viney and George W. ShieldsLeon NiemoczynskiThe Mind of Charles Hartshorne: A Critical Examination. Donald Wayne Viney and George W. Shields. Anoka, MN: Process Century Press, 2020. 584 pp. $40.00 cloth.Over the past decade process philosophy has undergone a significant renaissance most notably due to the towering presence of the thought of Alfred North Whitehead in that tradition. (...) Charles Hartshorne by manner of contrast has not had such a towering presence. Part of the reason this is the case is due to a paucity of introductory literature on the thought of Charles Hartshorne—literature that might contribute to a “starter kit” so to speak in mastering Hartshorne’s massive oeuvre. The Mind of Charles Hartshorne: A Critical Examination by Donald Wayne Viney and George W. Shields, both former students of Hartshorne and experts in process philosophy themselves, have authored a welcome contribution to an introductory literature that will most certainly elevate awareness of Hartshorne’s importance to its rightful place alongside that of Whitehead. The book is successful in its aims of “giving a reasonably comprehensive account of Hartshorne’s philosophy with an eye of presenting his best arguments...” (the “correcting what we see as misunderstandings of his views appearing in the critical literature” part may have been best left out) and “updating Hartshorne scholarship” (viii). There are ten chapters in total, appendix essays, the aforementioned bibliography, endnotes, and name and subject indexes.The Preface situates the mind of Charles Hartshorne as spanning the twentieth century and engaging metaphysics even when it was unfashionable to do so. Hartshorne thought about a wide-ranging and diverse range of subjects in both philosophy and science, aesthetics, metaphysics, applied philosophy, and theology. He never questioned modern science or evolution and believed that while metaphysics and empirical science have different methods each ensures its own way to objectivity. One learns that Hartshorne’s process metaphysics is also called “neo-classical” philosophy or speculative philosophy. His thought “gave full weight to the dynamic, relational, processive temporal and creative, affective dimensions of the universe” (vi). Hartshorne was known as much for his “panentheism,” or view that God transcends nature but also may be found immanently within it, as he was for his critique of traditional or scholastic classical theology—especially in his logic of theism where he recreates a modal version of the ontological argument. [End Page 94]Chapter 1, “The Career and Personality of Charles Hartshorne,” discusses just that. What seemed most important to me was the discussion of Hartshorne’s formative background of reading novels and poetry by Emerson, Melville, or Camus as a way of intensely living, his studying under William Ernest Hocking, and his Sheldon Traveling Fellowship where he studied for a time with Husserl and read and reviewed Heidegger. Probably the most important biographical details are that Hartshorne was given the assignment of editing the Peirce papers along with Paul Weiss as a Research Fellow while at Harvard University and he also met and graded for Whitehead, who along with C.S. Peirce, would become the twin pillars of all his thinking as a “Peircean and Whiteheadian” (11). From Peirce, we learn that Hartshorne took “possibility is best conceived of as a continuum with no least member” and from Whitehead, “actuality is discrete and discontinuous (atomistic), composed of momentary flashes of experiences” (11). For Hartshorne process and relativity are metaphysically basic.Chapter 2 begins with Hartshorne’s idea that, “Nature comes to us as constituted by feelings, not as constituted by lifeless, insentient matter” (28). Reality has an affective tone in which there is a layered complexity of feeling and social relation. In other words, contra Locke or Hume, feeling is objectively part of an objective affective continuum and is not nominalistically “painted on bare sense impressions” (46). Such might be described as a doctrine of “panexperientialism”— “the view that the basic constituents of reality are flashes of experience” (46). Experience and feeling stretch in their continuity to meet the bounds of nature. Chapter two continues with a wonderful discussion of Hartshorne’s aesthetics: “beauty is the mean between extremes” (48).Chapter 3 provides a... (shrink)

1. Le comte de Gobineau et l'arayanisme historique -- 2. Apôllon ou Dionysos : étude critique sur Fréderic Nietzsche et l'utilitarisme impérialiste -- 3. L'impérialisme démocratique -- 4. Le mal romantique essai sur l'impérialisme irrationnel.

Stephen Mumford develops his view of sport spectatorship partly through a rejection of an argument he attributes to Best, which distinguishes between two categories of sports, the ‘purposive’ and the ‘aesthetic’, on the basis of the claim that they have different principal aims. This paper considers the principal aim argument and one feature of Mumford’s rejection of that argument, namely, Best’s observation that the distinctions to which he draws attention are based on logical differences. The paper argues that Mumford misconstrues (...) Best’s argument by taking it to be about the intentions of players and athletes, while it is actually about a specific feature of the rules of each sport. (shrink)

This paper reinforces the current consensus against the applicability of the selected effect theory of function in ecology. It does so by presenting an argument which, in contrast with the usual argument invoked in support of this consensus, is not based on claims about whether ecosystems are customary units of natural selection. Instead, the argument developed here is based on observations about the use of the function concept in functional ecology, and more specifically, research into the relationship between biodiversity and (...) ecosystem functioning. It is argued that a selected effect account of ecological functions is made implausible by the fact that it would conflict with important aspects of the understanding of function and ecosystem functional organization which underpins functional ecology’s research program. Specifically, it would conflict with (1) Functional ecology’s adoption of a context-based understanding of function and its aim to study the functional equivalence between phylogenetically-divergent organisms; (2) Functional ecology’s attribution to ecosystems of a lower degree of part-whole integration than the one found in paradigm individual organisms; and (3) Functional ecology’s adoption of a physiological or metabolic perspective on ecosystems rather than an evolutionary one. (shrink)

This paper builds on a previous discussion of Stephen Mumford’s rejection of what he takes to be David Best’s argument for a distinction between purposive and aesthetic sports. That discussion concluded that Mumford’s argument misses its target, but closed by introducing a possible alternative argument, not made by Mumford, that might be thought to have the potential to secure Mumford’s conclusion. This paper considers that alternative argument, namely, the thought that the ascription of psychological predicates conceived of in terms of (...) defeasible criteria that constitute logically good evidence could preserve Best’s claim to be making a logical point while allowing a place for intention in relation to aims and purposes in sport. It is argued that the relationship between rules and intention is such that this alternative argument cannot secure Mumford’s conclusion. (shrink)

What does woman mean? According to two competing views, it can be seen as a sex term or as a gender term. Recently, Jennifer Saul has put forward a contextualist view, according to which woman can have different meanings in different contexts. The main motivation for this view seems to involve moral and political considerations, namely, that this view can do justice to the claims of trans women. Unfortunately, Saul argues, on further reflection the contextualist view fails to do justice (...) to those moral and political claims that motivated the view in the first place. In this article I argue that there is a version of the contextualist view that can indeed capture those moral and political aims, and in addition, I use this case to illustrate an important and more general claim, namely, that moral and political considerations can be relevant to the descriptive project of finding out what certain politically significant terms actually mean. (shrink)

This article presents the implications, objectives and initial results of a current ethnographic research project on music lovers. It looks at problems of theory and method posed by such research if it is not conceived only as the explanation of external determinisms, relating taste to the social origins of the amateur or to the aesthetic properties of the works. Our aim is, on the contrary, from long interviews and observations undertaken with music lovers, mostly in the classical field, to concentrate (...) on gestures, objects, mediums, devices and relations engaged in a form of playing or listening, which amounts to more than the actualization of a taste `already there', for they are redefined during the action, with a result that is partly uncertain. This is why amateurs' attachments and ways of doing things can both engage and form subjectivities, rather than merely recording social labels, and have a history, irreducible to that of the taste for works. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the question of what it means to say that a property is socially constructed. I focus on an influential project that many social constructivists are engaged in, namely, arguing against the inevitability of a trait, and I examine several recent characterizations of social construction, with the aim of assessing which one is more suited to the task.

This article interprets the logos Christology in the fourth gospel within Ewe-Ghanaian cosmic setting. The article employs a combination of the exegetical and mother tongue biblical hermeneutics as its methodologies. The article compares the concept of the logos in John 1:1–5, 14 with a similar concept in Ewe cosmology with the aim of finding their points of convergence and divergence. The article also identifies linguistic and theological gaps in the Ewe rendition of John 1:1–5, 14 and proposes a new translation (...) that addresses it. A translation of the logos in Ewe cosmic perspective renders the term nyagbe, the intelligible word which dwells with the female pair of Sogbe-Lisa and manifests itself from the absolute state of existence [ logo ] to the embodied state [ logosu ]. When nyagbe journeyed from the eternal state of existence to the embodied state of existence, it manifests itself at five different levels of existence until it reaches the final state where humans exist. Although believed to be the epitome of all creation, human beings are at the same time described as being at the shore of ignorance and therefore must continually climb the ladder of knowledge in order to free themselves from it. It is for this reason that humans constantly petition the cosmic forces for their salvation. The article therefore, identifies a soteriological gap created in the Ewe soteriology and concludes that the only soteriological response to the Ewe cosmic cry for deliverance from the state of ignorance is the logos incarnate in John 1:14. Contribution: The article contributes to the academic knowledge on the logos Christology in the prologue of the fourth gospel (John 1:1–5, 14), specifically in the use of mother tongue in biblical hermeneutics in Africa. (shrink)

Mobile health (mHealth) apps for self-monitoring increasingly gain relevance for public health. As a mobile technology, they promote individual participation in health monitoring with the aim of disease prevention and the mitigation of health risks. In this paper, I argue that users of mHealth apps must engage in value trade-offs concerning their fundamental dimensions of well-being when using mobile health apps for the self-monitoring of health parameters. I particularly focus on trade-offs regarding the user’s self-determination as well as their capacity (...) to form personal attachments. Depending on the user’s level of advantage or disadvantage, value trade-offs can pose a threat to the users’ sufficient fulfillment of the dimensions of well-being. As such, value trade-offs can entrench existing structural injustices and prevent disadvantaged users to benefit from this technology. I argue that value trade-offs are, to some, a type of injustice that can drive disadvantaged users away from a sufficiency threshold of well-being, risk users to fall below the threshold, or have an accumulative effect on different dimensions of the user’s well-being. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to pinpoint the issues involved in the analysis of the economy of “primitive” societies, as carried out by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus. To do so it focuses on a logic of debt (Nietzsche) rather than on a logic of reciprocity (Lévi-Strauss). Deleuze and Guattari’s critical discussion of Lévi-Strauss’s ethnology can thus be related to the problematization of kinship, understood as a system of alliance and filiation relationships, which is formulated within French Marxist (...) anthropology (E. Terray, C. Meillassoux) on the one hand, and Edmund Leach’s critical anthropology on the other. This double mediation helps to show that in Anti-Oedipus, what Deleuze and Guattari seek to identify are the political strategies at work in economic relations. In the present instance, this means the finite alliance strategies operating in “primitive” societies and which are deeper than trade and production relationships. (shrink)

Christopher Hom has recently argued that the best-overall account of the meaning of pejorative terms is a semantic account according to which pejoratives make a distinctive truth-conditional contribution, and in particular express complex, negative socially constructed properties. In addition, Hom supplements the semantic account with a pragmatic strategy to deal with the derogatory content of occurrences of pejorative terms in negations, conditionals, attitude reports, and so on, according to which those occurrences give rise to conversational implicatures to the effect that (...) the pejorative terms are non-empty, which explains the offensiveness of those occurrences. In this paper, I aim to defend this semantic strategy from several recent objections, and I will also present a novel objection, which in my view shows that we should understand the semantic account as a version of inferentialism, rather than radical externalism. (shrink)

This article draws on recent transnational protests against police brutality to advance an understanding of anti-racist solidarity that aims to improve over Mara Marin’s ‘structural solidarity’ view. On Marin’s view, anti-racist solidarity is grounded in the racial structure. But Marin forgets that racial domination exerts a segregative influence on different groups, so that whites and middle-class blacks tend not to frequent the social milieux that would help them develop a sense of solidarity with working-class blacks. To address this problem, the (...) article hypothesises that the conditions for anti-racist solidarity are not inherent in the racial structure but created by social movements, as exemplified by Black Lives Matter: to the extent that white and middle-class black participants in the George Floyd protests experienced the racist police brutality they were denouncing on behalf of the black working class, these protests functioned as non-segregated milieux that could ground the solidarity of the former with the latter at the national and transnational levels. (shrink)

Objectives To develop and test two educational programmes (interactive and passive) aimed at improving family doctors' (FD) prescribing practices and patient's knowledge and use of non-opioid analgesics (NOA).Methods The educational programmes were conducted in two family medicine clinics by using a three-stage approach: baseline evaluation, design, and implementation of educational activities, and post-programme evaluation. An interactive educational programme (IEP) was compared with a passive educational programme (PEP); both were participated by FDs and patients. The IEP for FDs comprised of workshops, (...) discussion groups, in-service training and guidelines, while for patients the IEP consisted of an interactive session with a video, leaflets and a discussion. The PEP consisted in delivering the guidelines to the FDs and the leaflets to patients. The effect of the programmes on the FDs was measured through the appropriateness of prescriptions and analysed using the differences-in-differences estimator (D-in-D), and on patients through changes in self-medication and in their knowledge about the proper use and adverse events by analysing the inter- and intra-group differences before and after the programmes.Results The IEP obtained better results to improve appropriate FDs prescription of NOA than PEP (D-in-D = 15%). Regarding the patients, the PEP group reached higher reduction of self-medication than the IEP group (13.4% vs. 9.1%); the knowledge of proper NOA use increased by 8.5% in both groups, whereas knowledge of NOA-related adverse events was better in the IEP (39.6%) than in the PEP group (9.2%).Conclusions The IEP was better to improve the doctors' abilities to prescribe NOAs, and both programmes improved patients' knowledge. (shrink)

This paper critically examines logical instrumentalism as it has been put forth recently in the anti-exceptionalism about logic debate. I will argue that if one wishes to uphold the claim that logic is significantly similar to science, as the anti-exceptionalists have it, then logical instrumentalism cannot be what previous authors have taken it to be. The reason for this, I will argue, is that as the position currently stands, first, it reduces to a trivial claim about the instrumental value of (...) logical systems, and second, by its denial that logic aims to account for extra-systemic phenomena it significantly differs from science, in contrast with the AEL agenda. I will conclude by proposing a different kind of logical instrumentalism that I take to have a broad appeal, but especially for anti-exceptionalists, for it is developed as analogous to—and thus much closer aligned with—scientific instrumentalism. (shrink)

Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true (or accurate), a second level if competent (or adroit), and a third if true because competent (or apt). Knowledge on one level (the animal level) is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of (...) epistemic normativity as does belief itself, yet to suspend is of course precisely not to perform, certainly not with the aim of truth. The paper takes up this problem, and proposes a solution that distinguishes levels of performance norrmativity, including a first order where execution competence is in play, and a second order where the performer must assess the risks attendant on issuing a first-order performance. This imports a level of reflective knowledge that ascends above the animal level. (shrink)

[ES] La creencia es considerada como una especie de expresión, que alcanza un nivel de éxito si es verdadera, un segundo nivel si es competente, y un tercero si es verdadera por ser competente. El conocimiento a un nivel es una creencia apta. La normatividad epistémica que constituye tal conocimiento es, de esta manera, una especie de normatividad de la expresión. Un problema surge para esta explicación del hecho de que la suspensión de la creencia parece caer bajo la misma (...) especie de normatividad epistémica que la creencia misma; aunque suspender es, sin embargo, precisamente no actuar, en todo caso no teniendo como objetivo la verdad. El presente trabajo examina este problema, y propone una solución que distingue varios niveles de normatividad de expresión, incluyendo un primer orden donde la competencia de expresión está en juego, y un segundo orden en que el ejecutante tiene que evaluar el riesgo concomitante con la realización de una expresión de primer orden. Esto introduce un nivel de conocimiento reflexivo que se eleva encima del nivel animal. [EN] Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true, a second level if competent, and a third if true because competent. Knowledge on one level is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of epistemic normativity as does belief itself, yet to suspend is of course precisely not to perform, certainly not with the aim of truth. The paper takes up this problem, and proposes a solution that distinguishes levels of performance normativity, including a first order where execution competence is in play, and a second order where the performer must assess the risks attendant on issuing a first-order performance. This imports a level of reflective knowledge that ascends above the animal level. (shrink)

The inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of these ways is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which has become one of the main strategies against the conceivability argument against physicalism. However, David Chalmers has recently presented a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy, and he has argued that no version of the strategy can succeed. In this paper, I examine the dilemma, and I argue that there is a way out of it. I conclude (...) that Chalmers has not posed any serious problem for the phenomenal concept strategy to succeed in blocking the conceivability argument. In doing so, my aim is not only to show that Chalmers’s argument has not refuted the phenomenal concept strategy, but also to clarify what any version of the strategy should achieve in order to be successful. (shrink)

»Anhänglichkeiten« gehören nicht zum Vokabular der Handlungstheorie. Sie sind zugleich unbestimmte und fesselnde Fäden in Bünden, die alle irgendetwas bewirken, aber als einzelne nicht selbstgenügsam, nicht unabhängig sind. Anstatt eindeutig zwischen bestimmenden und abhängigen Dingen zu unterscheiden, geht der Beitrag zu einer weniger scharfen, aber unendlich produktiveren Ansatz über, der bestimmende Handlungen als ein in Netzwerken disseminiertes faire faire ([jemanden etwas] tun machen) auffasst. Wesentlich wäre dann nicht, sich von »Anhänglichkeiten« zu befreien, sondern die guten von den schlechten zu trennen, (...) nicht indem man auf großartige Prinzipien zurückgreift, sondern indem man sich der immanenten Gerechtigkeit der Dinge überlässt. Aber wie wäre die Qualität einer »Anhänglichkeit« zu beurteilen? Der Beitrag sucht anhand von Beispiel-fällen von Sportlern, Drogensüchtigen und Musikliebhabern eine Art »anhänglicher« Moral zu entwickeln, die aus dem Gewebe unhintergehbarer Bindungen gemacht wäre. »Attachments« do not belong to the vocabulary of action. Incommensurable and situational, they are at once constraining and indeterminate, deployed in bonds that all do something, but among which none is independent for itself. Instead of distinguishing clearly between dependent and determining things, the paper passes to a less trenchant but infinitely more productive approach to distributed action, conceived as a (make [someone] do [something]) disseminated in networks. The essential, then, is not to liberate oneself from the attachments, but to sort the good ones from the bad, by leaning not on grand overarching principles but on the immanent justice in things. But how can we judge the quality of an »attachment«? Drawing on cases of sportsmen, drug addicts, and music lovers, this contribution aims to clarify what an »attached« morality could look like, a morality which would be made of the fabric of uncircumventable ties. (shrink)

»Attachments« do not belong to the vocabulary of action. Incommensurable and situational, they are at once constraining and indeterminate, deployed in bonds that all do something, but among which none is independent for itself. Instead of distinguishing clearly between dependent and determining things, the paper passes to a less trenchant but infinitely more productive approach to distributed action, conceived as a (make [someone] do [something]) disseminated in networks. The essential, then, is not to liberate oneself from the attachments, but to (...) sort the good ones from the bad, by leaning not on grand overarching principles but on the immanent justice in things. But how can we judge the quality of an »attachment«? Drawing on cases of sportsmen, drug addicts, and music lovers, this contribution aims to clarify what an »attached« morality could look like, a morality which would be made of the fabric of uncircumventable ties. (shrink)